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EU - China and the non-transparent race 
for inward FDI 
 
Abstract 
In this paper it is argued that the restructuring following the stiffer competition 
stemming from increased global integration will trigger a race between countries to 
attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI).    It is further argued that this 
race consists of last minute efforts and tailor-made packages designed by governments 
and their agencies to  temporarily improve  their country’s 
otherwise inferior profile.  This  race  is non-transparent  and the factors used to 
compete for inward FDI (the 'elements' of the race) deviate from those of long-term 
efforts to develop a favourable investment climate and improve productivity, as well 
as medium-term efforts, such as lowering corporate taxes. The paper elaborates on the 
research problem of properly understanding the drivers of inward FDI in the absence 
of data on the elements of the non-transparent race. It also addresses the economic 
policy problem following from this race with a scenario where a large share of global 
FDI ends up in China,  putting the cohesion of the EU at stake and triggering a 
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EU - China and the non-transparent race 




1. Introduction  
 
During the last three decades, we have witnessed profound changes in the global 
economic map. We have seen increased openness to inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a result of a considerable revision of investment regimes in a positive 
direction. Figures for 2004 show that 85 per cent of 271 regulatory changes 
undertaken that year by 102 countries were favourable to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (UNCTAD, 2005). We have also seen strong regional policy coordination, as in 
the case of the EU. The increase of the number of member countries to 27 in January 
2007 and the completion of the first round of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), with 12 original member countries (hereafter, “EMU countries”) 
having a common currency and central bank, constitute important progress in terms of 
economic, monetary and political integration. Moreover, we have seen the re-
appearance of a new major global player, China. Taken together, the new economic 
map will make the competition for inward FDI stiffer, and special investment patterns 
will develop.  One such pattern – the non-transparent race for inward FDI – will be 
discussed in this paper. 
The developing economies have managed to attract an increased share of 
global inward FDI. After a global peak in 2000, FDI-flows decreased by almost 35 
per cent over the following five years.  However, in this period the developing 
economies gained - in terms of FDI “market shares” - almost 17 percentage points and   4
reached 36 per cent, the highest share since 1997
1 whereas the developed economies 
lost slightly more than 20 percentage points (a drop from 80 per cent to 59 per cent). 
(See Figure 1).  
    
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
A point of departure for this paper is that increased economic integration fosters 
increased competition that calls for a restructuring of global industries. Economic 
activities (e.g. production) are moving to sites that can provide them with the best 
conditions. During the last decade, China has, to an increasing extent, attracted FDI 
which had previously materialised in the developed world. Until recently it had the 
status of being the low-cost manufacturing platform for the world’s largest 
companies. But statements from the Chinese leaders in 2007 made explicit that China 
from now on will opt for inward investment in knowledge-intense production. There 
also seems to be an interest by global firms to move R&D into China. A survey 
(UNCTAD, 2005) for the time span 2005-2009 shows that the most attractive 
prospective R&D location for these firms is China (61.8 per cent) followed by the 
United States (41.2 per cent) and India (29.4 per cent). Members of the European 
Union are found to be less attractive:  the UK is ranked number five (13.2 per cent) 
followed by France (8.8 per cent) as number seven and Germany (5.9 per cent) as 
number eight. The result, however, is much tougher for the small European countries 
with, for instance, Ireland and Sweden receiving just 1.5 per cent of the responses in 
the survey. Hence, there are reasons for concern among policymakers in the EU.   
                                                 
1  Based on figures from UNCTAD 2006.   5
Today, the EU countries in general, and the EMU countries in particular, do 
not have much leeway to make themselves look attractive by using the 
macroeconomic situation to their best advantage (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004). With a 
common monetary policy and shrinking space for autonomous fiscal policy, the EMU 
countries all look equally attractive from a macroeconomic point of view. Moreover, 
the UNCTAD (2005) survey, referred to above, reported low interest for the EU-
countries, particularly the small, peripheral ones, whereas China was found to be by 
far the most attractive investment location (85 per cent of global FDI experts and 87 
per cent of global transnational corporations expressed this view). Considering the 
structure of China, the inflow of FDI may trigger a race between its different regions. 
In this perspective, it may be worth mentioning that the survey reports prospects for a 
dramatically increased use of investment policy measures.  
In this paper, we argue, based on global historic analogies, that policy-makers 
in the EU countries, as a response to the prospects of losing knowledge-intense FDI to 
China, will fight for inward investment using “grey” measures. A general ban on such 
measures will, however, give rise to a non-transparent  race for inward FDI with 
economic and research policy consequences. This race will use means that deviate 
from transparent long-term efforts aimed at improving productivity and the general 
investment climate  in order to attract investment. These means are also different from 
the transparent ones used in the competition for investment in a medium-term 
perspective, such as, for instance a general lowering of corporate taxes. 
The non-transparent race can appear in many forms and does not necessarily 
start with a government taking the initiative. In recent years, we have seen a race in 
which the initiative comes from individual companies, demonstrating some 
resemblance to blackmailing. For instance, in 2005 General Motors (GM) urged -   6
under threat of closure - a number of production plants in Europe to compete with 
each other and to convince GM which of them deserved to survive. Saab’s production 
site in Trollhättan (Sweden) had to compete with GM’s production site in 
Rüsselsheim (Germany) for the production of the third generation of GM’s middle 
range cars.  
The GM case saw all kinds and levels of governments, authorities and labour 
unions involved in offering different incentives in a package aimed at boosting the 
chances of their site surviving. Hence, although GM’s headquarters urged the 
subsidiaries to demonstrate their future ability, this ability was strengthened in a non-
transparent way by incentives and efforts provided by many other stakeholders. For 
instance, some days before the decision was to be taken, the Swedish prime minister 
travelled to GM’s European headquarters to meet with its top-management team. This 
was not a courtesy trip, but was undertaken to provide a last set of offers to tip the 
decision in favour of production in Trollhättan. The German chancellor, Gerhard 
Schröder, at that time almost declared “industrial war”; promising to do all he could 
to bring the production to Rüsselsheim. Hence, we already now see indications that 
with a stiffer investment climate, i.e. with China attracting a large share of global FDI 
flows, the cohesion of the EU may be threatened.  The non-transparent race may also 
appear in a form where companies ask up front what a government can offer in order 
to win the competition for their cross-border investment as, for example, in Slovakia 
2005 (Blomberg, 2005).  
This paper elaborates on the research problem of properly understanding the 
drivers of inward FDI in the absence of data on the elements of the non-transparent 
race. It addresses the economic policy as well as research policy problems following 
from this race with a scenario where the bulk of inward FDI ends up in China, putting   7
the cohesion of the European Union at stake. In the absence of other than anecdotal 
evidence, we here discuss the non-transparent race for inward FDI with a normative 
lens.  
Although we focus on the non-transparent race at the governmental level we 
acknowledge that the race for inward FDI is a multilevel issue. In a regional context, 
the authorities may try to attract inward FDI to the regions that are then the target of 
the non-transparent race at the country level. Once a country has successfully 
managed to attract FDI there may follow a race at the sub-regional or local 
government level (of particular interest to China) that, perhaps, ends up in a race at 
the city level.   
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some stylized facts 
about the FDI balance between the EU and China and in Section 3 we discuss the 
background to the race for FDI. Section 4 deals with the different incentives of the 
non-transparent race for inward FDI. In Section 5, the costs and benefits of the race 
are presented. Section 6 discusses the regulatory body adopted by the EU and the 
WTO aimed at preventing a race from developing. Finally, Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Inward FDI:   Some Stylized Facts for China and the EU 
 
In 2005, China became the number three recipient of inward FDI in the world, after 
the United States and the UK (Figure 2). China’s market share increased in the early 
2000s and reached about 8 per cent in 2005 (12 per cent with Hong Kong included). 
Admittedly, the potential measurement error may be large and as reported in the 
UNCTAD FDI/TNC database may amount to a divergence of about 80 per cent, as in   8
the case of the US investment in China in 2002 (USD5.2 billion reported by Chinese 
authorities as compared to only USD924 million reported by US authorities). This 
error, however, often refers to contracted versus actual FDI, which is illustrated in 
Table 1. In any case, the FDI flow figures for China should be interpreted with 
caution. Stock figures – when available - are even harder to interpret. India is often 
mentioned as increasing its inward FDI and as a major competitor to China. However, 
India managed to attract far smaller flows and had a market share of less than 1 per 
cent of global inward investments in 2005.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
In 2004, the EU faced a new and tough reality. First, the EU experienced a close to 50 
per cent decrease of FDI inflows compared with 2002. Second, the EU was surpassed 
by the developing world for the first time in terms of inward FDI (USD233 billion and 
USD216 billion, respectively, out of a global total of USD648 billion). China, Hong 
Kong/China, Korea and India attracted close to 50 per cent of the inflows to the 
developing world. EU lost shares in a shrinking market. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Increased market shares for China can to, a large extent, be explained by, for example, 
low labour costs and large market potential. However, Chinese authorities may 
themselves participate in the non-transparent race; they are certainly taking part in the 
transparent race. Actually, a major institutional reform took place as early as in 1979 
when specific policy preferences to attract FDI were designated. These policies later   9
led to the first establishment of Special Economic Zones and to a later opening of 
coastal provinces for inward FDI. In this context, the Guangdong province (a top 
recipient of inward FDI) became the designated showroom (Ng and Tuan, 2001).  
  Chinese FDI policies have changed over time and differ from one region to 
another. Reflecting different stages of the economic reform process, we see regional 
variations expressed in the creation of Special Economic zones, Coastal Economic 
Zones and Central Reform Testing Zones. These policies have also given foreign 
investors preferential tax treatment (tax rates and tax holidays) to stimulate 
cooperation between multinational companies and local enterprises (Ng and Tuan, 
2001). A beneficial tax rate for foreign direct investors is still offered. The Chinese 
deregulation and opening up to inward FDI was experimental in design and gradual in 
terms of its sequencing, following the Chinese proverb “for unfamiliar rivers, 
touching the stone at the river bed is the best strategy to cross the river” (Child, 2001). 
Part of the efforts devoted to attract inward FDI to China has been spent on creating 
an investor-friendly investment environment in structural dimensions: a “hard” 
dimension regarding physical infrastructure, a “soft” one involving administrative 
infrastructure, and a third dimension containing socio-economic factors (Li and Li, 
1999; Lu and Tsai, 2000). Sovereign wealth funds may also play an important role in 
the future transparent competition for inward investment (acquired instead of 
attracted), containing missing pieces for Chinese knowledge creation.  
Hence, China has been involved in a transparent race that may explain some of 
the increase of 19.4 per cent in actual utilised FDI in 2005 compared with the 
previous year (www.fdi.gov.cn). China’s active participation in attracting inward FDI 
may increase the probability that they will also join the non-transparent race.   10
Moreover, the propensity of China to get involved in the non-transparent race will 
increase with stiffer competition for knowledge-intensive production.  
In addition, we argue that an increasing share of global flows of knowledge-
intensive FDI to China will trigger an intra-EU race for FDI as well as a regional race 
in China when it comes to the decision about the end destination for inward 
investments. The restructuring process within the EU will take time, and some 
governments will be tempted to take shortcuts to gain an improved market position. 
They will find new ways to convince foreign investors to opt for their country by the 
use of non-transparent incentives. It is a matter of not only attracting new investments 
but also relocating existing investments from one place to another.  
For example, in 2000, the German tyre manufacturer, Continental, moved its 
production from a small village in Sweden to Portugal. An artificially low production 
cost – subsidised by the EU to the amount of EURO50 million – caused a painful 
plant closure with about 500 lost jobs in one EU country at the expense of the 
emergence of a new production location and new jobs in another EU country. In 2002, 
Ford received in a similar way about EURO20 million as regional support to expand 
its production of Volvo car engines in Wales. As a result of the expansion, Ford 
decided to close down its production in another EU country, which happened to be 
Sweden also in this case. In both these examples there may just as well have been 
non-transparent incentives provided by the host country governments. 
 
3.  Background to the Non-transparent Race for Inward FDI 
 
During most of the post-World War II period up to the 1980s, inward FDI flows were 
seen with a certain amount of scepticism. This negative view was often a result of a   11
mistake made by governments inviting only selected firms to invest in their country. 
Despite the fact that the selected firm was most often at the leading edge of 
technology and management skill, the mere procedure of inviting only one firm in a 
particular sector meant that many countries missed most of the benefits from inward 
FDI and ended up leaving them disappointed.  
        The  playing  field  for  FDI  changed substantially during the 1980s. From a 
historical perspective, the expansion of FDI during this decade had its parallel in the 
trade expansion of the 1950s and 1960s. While the international trade expansion was 
fuelled by multilateral trade liberalisation, the FDI expansion was, to a large extent, 
prompted by the global abolition of capital controls. In the 1980s, borders were 
opened up and inward FDI flows were in most countries no longer restricted. 
Economic integration increased, stimulated by increased financial integration
2. 
Governments started to realise the benefits that may accrue to them and saw suddenly 
FDI inflows as the remedy for many domestic problems.  
        The regulatory changes differed substantially between countries with respect to 
timing, activities of supervisory authorities and content of external and internal de-
regulative measures. Among the external measures, the abolition of capital controls 
and a general opening up for inward FDI were the most important ones. Within the 
group of internal measures, the relaxation of limits on activities in which different 
firms may engage, and the rules that discriminate against foreign-owned firms deserve 
to be mentioned in this context.  
Once the deregulation had opened up the way for FDI, several structural forces 
fuelled its growth. Increased regionalisation (EU, NAFTA, etc) and the “outsider’s” 
fear of increased protection and discrimination, maturing markets for international 
                                                 
2 From a conceptual point of view the two forms of integration are overlapping, since they both include 
FDI. From a causal point of view it can be claimed that the financial integration was triggered and 
made inevitable by the increased internationalisation of firms.    12
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and the increasing role of services, which at the 
beginning of the 2000s accounted for 50-55 per cent of total FDI outflows from most 
major source countries, are the most prominent examples of these forces (UNCTAD 
2005). Globalisation and regional integration, on the one hand, and technological and 
commercial know-how of MNEs on the other, transformed the relationship between 
governments and MNEs from a position of confrontation to one characterised by 
openness and bargaining over investments.  
At the beginning of the 1990s there was no global institution committed to this 
task of supranational supervision, though the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank and 
the GATT were all potential candidates for this role. The EU, however, did assume 
the role of supranational authority in a regional framework. Extensive efforts have 
been made to control competition for inward investment among the EU members. The 
question is, then, to what extent have these efforts been sufficient to curb a movement 
towards increased competition between EU member-states for inward FDI without 
having the competition transformed into a non-transparent race?  It is, therefore, a 
delicate task to nail down those governments that have participated in the race, 
pretending, for instance, that the sale of an under-priced building to the investing 
company was just a bad business deal. The task becomes even more delicate when 
non-transparent incentives are used as ingredients of the race.  
 
3.1 EU and China as a trigger for a new race 
In the 1990s, a veritable ‘race’ for inward FDI was visible as a means to solve the 
problem of growing unemployment (Oxelheim, 1993; Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004). 
Governments started to elbow out their competitors by attracting inward FDI with the 
use of economic equivalents of anabolic steroids. Since some of the incentives used   13
were non-transparent, the net effect of the race and the magnitude of the repercussions 
(to the extent they have already accrued) are seldom reported. The fierce competition 
for inward investment created losers as well. Frustrated governments that were not 
willing to compete with the same means, or were unsuccessful in the race, may have 
considered retaliation by imposing restrictions on capital movement. The closer to the 
end of the political mandate, the greater the temptation. Despite periods of temporary 
increases of restrictions there is no evidence that this early version of the race actually 
triggered a wave of re-regulation (Oxelheim 1996).  
The losers blamed governments of successful host countries for their own 
failures. In this respect we can once again see a parallel in international trade. This 
time we have a parallel in the Omnibus Trade Act (1988) that granted US authorities 
the right to bilateral negotiations with representatives of countries that, according to 
the US view, engaged in unfair trading practices, hence triggering a retreat from a 
multilateral to a bilateral world. In a global recession, there will be many 
interpretations about what is “fair” or not.  
In a world of perfect financial integration, expected real returns will be the 
same on projects that are identical except for currencies and jurisdictions. The 
international purchasing power parity and the international Fisher parity both prevail. 
The EU is moving in that direction; with – at the end of the process - one currency 
adopted by all member states and one policy for all. Hence inside the EU, perfect 
monetary and political integration will prevail. In such a world, where regulatory 
barriers have been removed, taxes harmonised, takeover defenses dismantled, 
economic policymaking coordinated, accounting principles and disclosure norms 
harmonised, and transactions cost suppressed to a minimum, there is little left for 
individual governments to use in a competition for inward FDI in accordance with the   14
EU regulatory body. However, if we broaden the scope and look into the grey area, 
i.e., accept non-transparent incentives as well, we may identify five categories of 
incentives for the politicians to package in a selective or tailor made fashion rather 
than in a general policy framework. 
 The incentives we are addressing in this paper could also be put in a policy 
context as part of an investment-diverting policy. According to the Lisbon declaration, 
the EU polices should, at an aggregate level, be investment creating. They should aim 
at improving the competitive power of the EU region, boost productivity and 
efficiency. Investment in the EU then comes as a response to new opportunities and 
improved attractiveness. However, investors from outside the EU may see some of 
these EU-policies as investment diverting. Policies adding to this view are, for 
example, anti-dumping rules strengthening the outsiders’ view of the EU as “Fortress 
Europe”. Governments in individual member countries may then pursue their own 
investment-diverting policies. Some policies, for example, local content rules, will 
signal that if you do not produce in a particular market you will not get access to it. 
Other policies will work as incentives aimed at convincing the outsider to produce in 
a particular country by pointing at an “artificially” low production cost – for example 
made possible through subsidies - as compared to what can be achieved elsewhere.  
We rest this paper on the assumption that in an integrated region like the EU 
there will remain some acceptable incentives to be used by governments to lure 
inward FDI, but in this setting, we claim that the temptation to use old or to invent 
new forms of non-transparent incentives will be great. Moreover, in the race China’s 
huge exchange reserves may increase the probability of making the option of a high 
knowledge-content of FDI into China come true through the investments of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds. Stiffer global competition will fuel financial creativity and engineering   15
aimed at circumventing regulations and standards or disguising the abusive use of 
incentives. Hence, we expect to see a non-transparent race characterized by the key 
words: targeted firms and tailor-made incentive packages.  
 
4.  The Elements of the Non-transparent Race 
 
A strand of literature has analysed the dependence of FDI upon location attractiveness 
(Vernon, 1966; Caves, 1971; Dunning, 1977, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2000; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Hymer, 1976; Rugman, 1980; Baldwin and Krugman, 2001; Ghauri 
et.al. 2004). Government policies, both from home and, more importantly, from host 
markets, play an important role in forming the location advantage, expressed as the 
“L” in the “OLI” paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2000; Aharoni 1966; 
Aliber 1970, Buckley and Ghauri, 2004).  What constitute the non-transparent race are 
efforts by the government to improve the L advantages of the OLI configuration by a 
typical “last-minute” use of non-transparent incentives. 
The incentives (or elements of the race) given to foreign firms to invest in a 
particular country may be grouped into five major categories: 1) subsidies and tax 
packages, 2) looser interpretations of international agreements, 3) home country 
biased consumers, 4) cyclical and geographical features, and 5) information 
advantages and agglomeration support. The incentives can be characterised as 
inherent, such as language advantages, or created, such as subsidies. They may also be 
distinguished by whether or not they have a benchmark position. Some types of 
information advantages are examples of incentives that have a benchmark position, 
since they vanish when a country reaches the information efficiency of the rest of the 
world. Subsidies belong to the group of incentives that lack a benchmark position,   16
since the upper limit of what a country can offer is very diffuse. Incentives within 
categories 1-3, in general, and the created ones in particular, lend themselves to the 
non-transparent race. 
We have so far only mentioned policies for attracting inward FDI. However, 
in a world of high and growing interdependence these policies often accompany 
policies for domestic investment. Policies favourable to domestic investment very 
often also attract inward FDI. Similarly, policies that make domestic investment 
unattractive often discourage inward FDI. They encourage outward FDI as home 
companies and residents look abroad for better uses of their capital. Moreover, a 
successful campaign from the government in country A to look attractive may result 
in an out-location of investment from country B to country A. A substitution 
relationship between outward FDI and investment at home has been found for 
Schumpeter industries, whereas a complementary relationship has been reported for 
Heckscher-Ohlin industries (Braunerhjelm and Oxelheim, 2000; Braunerhjelm et al, 
2005). 
 
4.1 Subsides and tax packages 
The first group of incentives for attracting inward FDI in a non-transparent way 
consists of different kinds of subsidies. Some of the incentives in this category may be 
seen as inherent, at least in a phase of transition, or rather inherited from the pre-
integration period. These are common in political economies (like the Nordic 
countries) that are characterised by a high level of political involvement and a high 
average tax burden (as percent of GDP). Hence, by directing investment to such 
countries, the corporation may get free access to infrastructure, while an investment in 
other countries may be connected with high fees for the use of highways,   17
telecommunications, etc. Governments may use these incentives in marketing 
campaigns in a transparent way to attract inward investments. However, they can also 
choose to create new incentives by subsidising improvements in infrastructure.  
Among the traditional created subsidies to be used in the non-transparent race 
we delineate the following five categories: a) grants; b) tax concessions; c) soft loans 
d) equity participation; and e) warranties.  
    The non-transparent character of the incentives used by governments to attract 
inward FDI forces us to rely on anecdotal evidence. Table 2 helps us to understand the 
extent to which different governments have used subsidies in some industries.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Using the automotive as well as the electronics, chemicals and semiconductors 
industries as examples, we show in Table 2 that the race was stiff already in the 
1990s. The trend indicated above – to the extent a trend in a non-transparent area can 
be identified - supports the observation that the size of incentives has increased over 
the last three decades (Thomas, 1996; O’Malley, 2000). Despite the formal adherence 
to the principles of “national treatment”, the incentives offered at state (South 
Carolina – BMW, Alabama – Mercedes, etc) and local levels in the United States and 
at the regional and national levels (France – Toyota, United Kingdom – Ford, etc) in 
the EU seem to provide evidence in this regard.  
Grants (excluding supranational grants) in their reported and transparent forms 
were in the 1980s and the early 1990s the most important components of total 
subsidisation used by the EU and EFTA countries (Austria, Germany, Iceland and 
Portugal are exceptions). They were particularly used to subsidise capital formation. 
Table 3 shows that grants employed by most EU member states in the early 2000s.    18
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Subsidies are used very differently in the OECD countries, most of them for sub-
sector specific purposes (not shown in Table 3). For instance, the EU average for 
1986-88 (excluding supranational support) for sub-sector-specific purposes was 65.4 
per cent of total industrial subsidies, based on figures from CEC (1990). The region-
specific support came second, amounting to 15.6 per cent. The average for the EFTA 
countries (SITC 2 and 3) for 1984-1987 was 42 per cent.  Region-specific and other 
general support came next, totalling about 20 per cent each (see EFTA 1998). 
Switzerland exhibited the highest figure of all European countries for research and 
development subsidies (33.9 per cent of total industrial subsidies). Denmark was at 
the top in terms of environmental subsidies (5.8 per cent), while the Netherlands was 
the country that devoted the largest share of subsidies to small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
Tax concessions are tax-code provisions that favour some sectors or economic 
activities, such as capital formation, over others. Although international comparisons 
are of limited value in this context due to incommensurability of data, the relative use 
of this form of subsidy is known to have been relatively high in the United States and 
in Germany. The relevance of taxation politics to the location decision process of 
MNEs has fuelled a great debate. Those in favour claim that they encourage 
operational efficiencies by constraining excess and ensuring government policies that 
are responsive to citizens’ preferences (Ellis 1999). They also argue that competition 
provides the most efficient means to the end of harmonisation of tax rates and 
provisions. Those against tax competition argue that it results in economic distortions   19
in the locations of FDI and deterioration of the welfare state (Hendricks 2000). Tax 
incentives used in the non-transparent race are those given to individual targeted 
firms. Due to their non-transparent character reports about their potentially distorting 
effect have not been published. 
As regards the use of tax incentives in general policy-making and how to cope 
with this, the EU Code of Conduct on Business Taxation emphasises tax coordination 
(EU-COM 1997, p. 564), while earlier reports (The Ruding Report 1992) 
recommended harmonisation of tax systems within the EU. The principal assumption 
underlying the Code is that the competitive tax position of all countries is equal. This 
clearly ignores the fact that there is great disparity among the 27 Member States, both 
on economic and geographical levels. Moreover, without some form of tax-
coordination within the EU, there may also be a destructive tax competition, a ‘race to 
the bottom’, that would undermine the long-term sustainability of Europe’s welfare 
structures.  
Consider the case of Ireland: Since the 1950s Ireland has adopted a policy of 
attracting FDI through tax incentives. Until 1982 Ireland granted a full tax holiday to 
all new sales made by a foreign manufacturing company. Since 1982, however, 
companies have been entitled to an automatic preferential corporate tax rate of 10 per 
cent on all manufacturing profits, regardless of the location where these profits have 
been generated. Profits derived from manufacturing and qualifying services enjoyed a 
rate of 10 per cent until the end of 2002. Thereafter, Ireland agreed with the EU 
commission for a corporate tax rate of 12.5 per cent to apply to all trading activities 
(agreement reached July 22, 1998). The special tax rate (10 per cent) has been widely 
recognised as one of the main factors inducing MNEs to locate in Ireland (O’Malley 
2000; O’Connor 2001).    20
Soft loans comprise loans from the government to the private sector at terms 
more favourable than those obtained on the open market.  The use of this form of 
subsidy has been relatively high in, for example, Denmark, France and Japan. In 
Japan most soft loans have been offered to small and medium-sized firms. Table 3 
shows that the use of loans as an investment incentive is very common. 
Government equity participation involves subsidy to the extent that the rate of 
return demanded by the government falls below that demanded by private capital 
markets.  Among the EU and EFTA countries, the relative use of this form of subsidy 
was, in the 1980s, by far the greatest in Austria (See EFTA 1987 and 1998; CEC, 
1990; Ford and Syker, 1990). The use of this form of incentive can easily be disguised 
within the (pretended) frame of a joint venture.   
Governments may also offer guarantees/warrantees on loans as a form of 
subsidy. This has particularly been the case in Iceland, France and Sweden. Incentives 
contributing to a lower cost of capital of the potential investor will work as a trigger 
for FDI, as pointed out in an OLI-framework by Oxelheim et al (2001). To the extent 
that this lowering is conditioned by a subsidy or other cost-reducing incentives from a 
particular country, the case for inward investment to that particular country is 
improved. 
 
4.2 Looser interpretations of international agreements 
Here we find two kinds of policies aimed at reducing the production costs by lowering 
requirements put on the producing firms. The incentives are typically created as part 
of the non-transparent race. One of these is the lowering of the requirements put on 
the labour environment; i.e., social dumping. The case often referred to here is the 
move of Hoover (the producer of vacuum cleaners) from France to Scotland.   21
Moreover, some may argue that this is not a result of governmental policies but rather 
of labour union policies. A kind of social dumping was used in the GM case 
mentioned previously. Labour unions started to offer (or to compete in a semi-
transparent way by offering) more working-hours for an unchanged wage in a last 
minute effort to convince GM not to close down their respective factories.  
The second alternative is the lowering of the bar for the environmental 
responsibility of the firm, i.e. environmental dumping. This may also appear as firms 
of new EU member countries are granted the “non-transparent” permission to catch 
up with corporate environmental responsibility at a slower pace than otherwise 
requested (Lundan, 2004).  
 
4.3 Nationalism and home-country biased consumer 
The third group contains incentives that work via some kind of support to home-
country biased consumption. The incentives may be used in a more or less non-
transparent way. These incentives provide a soft alternative to traditional trade 
barriers. Instead of imposing a tax on imports, consumption of goods and services 
produced domestically are subsidised. One way of doing this, which requires no 
outright payments from the government, is to play on nationalistic feelings. This stick 
approach has been used for years but often for capital account reasons. The former 
Russian president Boris Jeltsin urged the Russian people to buy goods produced in 
Russia. For a foreign producer of goods intended for the Russian market this turned 
into an incentive to move production to Russia in order to gain access to the Russian 
market. The stick will, of course, only have an effect on companies that are keen to 
get access to a very big market or to a market of great importance to the company’s 
profitability.  In the United States, “made-in-America” or “made-in-the-USA”   22
campaigns are good examples of national campaigns that forced Japanese automobile 
firms to invest in the United States.  It is easy to imagine that the nationalistic 
argument may be used as an implicit stick, i.e. from a statistical point of view in a 
non-transparent way. 
 
4.4 Cyclical and geographical factors 
The two remaining categories are primarily not designed to be used in the non-
transparent race. The fourth kind of incentives include inherent geographical 
advantages, such as differences in business cycles and seasonal patterns, and other 
such differences that will remain even as integration becomes more or less perfect. 
The availability of up-to-date infrastructure is a major factor that attracts FDI to a 
market. A number of authors have studied this phenomenon to explain why certain 
markets become the primary choice for FDI projects by MNEs (see e. g. Dunning 
1986; Morris 1988; Buckley and Ghauri 1999b; Ghauri et.al. 2004). Most of these 
studies report that MNEs invest in markets that have up-to-date infrastructure as 
regards transportation and communication. The incentives in this group are mostly 
inherited and need to be marketed in order to become true drivers of inward 
investment. Finland, as a country in the periphery of EU, may attract inward 
investment by translating its geographical position into “the gate to Eastern Europe”. 
Similarly, deviations in terms of business cycles and seasons may be translated into 
incentives.  
 
4.5 Information advantages and agglomeration support 
The fifth group of incentives is associated with information in general and with 
transparent competition for inward investment. It contains more marketing-oriented 
arguments like a low degree of investment bureaucracy, a high level of education and   23
broad competencies, rich agglomeration, etc. The argument with a potential use in the 
non-transparent race is related to the language of the host country. Language plays a 
role in attracting inward FDI (Ghauri et.al. 2004). For instance, the difficulty of the 
Chinese language may be used to trigger inward investment in China even though the 
country may be integrated in all other dimensions. The Chinese government may also 
“help” foreign firms to realise the necessity of being present in China by imposing 
rules or a praxis, for instance, that all consumer information should be written in 
Chinese. Governments may turn a language disadvantage or the classic Chinese 
practice of guangxi into a case for attracting (or pushing) a foreign investment.   
 
5. The Costs and Benefits of Attracting FDI 
 
What then can a host country do in order to boost it chances to attract a targeted firm? 
The question leads to two sub-questions: First, what constitutes a successful policy in 
an integrated world? Appropriate liberalization policies appear to be a necessary 
precondition for attracting FDI. However, changes in the economic and market 
conditions are also necessary. What may then tip the opinion in favour of a particular 
host country is the addition by the government of that country of an incremental 
flavour to boost the attractiveness. Between two equally endowed locations, the non-
transparent incentives may make the difference. The second question is then: Can 
anything be achieved by government policies to attract FDI? 
The major reasons for welcoming inward FDI at the government level is that 
FDI brings: 1) spill-over of technology; 2) spill-over of management skills; 3) capital 
flows with no debt-servicing obligation attached; 4) new domestic jobs; and, finally, 
5) additional production capacity. We may here note that the first two benefits, which   24
are often achieved in an agglomeration context, confront governments with a delicate 
problem.  
There is also a cost side of inward FDI for the host country, although most 
researchers seem to agree that benefits of inward FDI exceed costs (McDermott 1989; 
Oxelheim 1993; Buckley and Ghauri 1999a). A problem in calculating the cost is to 
evaluate the opportunity cost in terms of the value forgone by using the money on 
incentives rather than on direct measures to improve productivity, efficiency and 
knowledge creation. When the estimated value of offered incentives amounts to 
USD3.4 million per job created, as shown in Table 2 for the case when Dow was 
attracted to Germany in 1996, this concern seems relevant (Lowendahl 2001). Perhaps 
there was also a social and/or signal value from the 2000 jobs created as a response to 
an incentive package amounting to USD6.8 billion that should be included in the cost-
benefit analysis to properly understand the logic of German politicians in this 
particular case. The cost/job when South Carolina managed to attract BMW may to 
some also seem high. However, ten years later, when the number of jobs has actually 
increased ten times, the initial cost/job may seem reasonable.  
To what extent can positive effects from the use of incentives be expected to 
accrue to the host country? The answer to this question is not easy and clear-cut. For 
the company the uncertainty is a matter of the duration of the offer. On the cost side, 
the company has to be sure that the incentive offered, for example, a subsidy on 
interest rate, is not withdrawn prematurely. Otherwise, the company may end up with 
negative returns for the investment and run the risk of being out-competed, causing 
capital waste.  
The new type of political risk does not reflect the general behaviour of 
politicians (Oxelheim 1996), but rather a relative-risk vis-à-vis competitors.   25
Management knows that the government is inclined to provide non-transparent 
incentives since it has been offered some and invested based on them, but the 
management is uncertain about the package that the government has offered its 
competitor or what other countries offer it. Hence, though a firm gets a very beneficial 
package from politicians it may be out-competed by another firm that has received an 
even better package. The new version of political risk thus becomes a transparency 
issue. 
  Within the balanced-budget framework, the only constraint on the use of 
incentives connected to outright costs (in a tax-harmonised world) is the availability 
of fiscal resources. In the EU-context, the taxation issue is still a national one, though 
there are forces working in favour of taxation becoming an issue for the EU 
(Andersson et al, 2007). However, harmonisation efforts are geared only to the tax 
rate and base. By giving priority to subsidies for attracting inward investment, in the 
short term, some other tax-financed projects may have to be postponed. In the longer 
term, however, more resources may become available with the potential expansion of 
the tax-base that the new inward investments will cause. In an integrated world, 
access to global savings is free and governments may find it tempting to finance 
subsidies through loans, making the upper limit of their efforts to attract inward FDI a 
subtle question.  
For governments of host countries, it is of crucial importance that firms that 
have been targeted and attracted deliver all that is expected from them. If not, it is 
essential to have contracts stating a repayment of incentives received. Moreover, the 
host country A’s government always runs the risk that some other countries, B and C, 
bid for the same kind of investment and offer an even better package to the 
competitors of the attracted firm. This will render these firms a lower cost of capital   26
and a good chance to out-compete the firm attracted by country A. This is part of what 
is called the race to the top of incentives. However, for the government of a host 
country there is a risk that an over-generous subsidy may signal future problems in the 
host economy and, hence, repress rather than attract inward FDI.  
From a global or regional welfare point of view, the race is often claimed to 
have an adverse effect. The incentives may divert production from country A, with the 
most efficient production conditions, to the less efficient country B. At first glance, 
this might leave the region as a loser and the host country B as a winner. However, 
over a longer period, the production conditions in host country B (who managed to 
attract the investment) may improve as a result of the attracted FDI. Efficient 
production may emerge and offer country A (to the extent it has kept its efficiency 
intact) stiff competition from which, eventually, the entire region will benefit.  
 
6.  The EU and WTO: The Regulatory Framework 
 
In the previous sections, we have found evidence of a non-transparent race for inward 
FDI inside the EU as well as on a global scope. How well is the existing regulatory 
body equipped to prevent the race from emerging? In this section we will see what 
legal forces are currently in place to hinder the transparent race. The non-transparent 
part of the race is by definition harder to regulate. 
 
6.1 The EU regulatory framework 
 
As European countries are increasingly becoming “FDI friendly,” they can, based on 
the historical record be put into three groups according to their eagerness to attract 
FDI. Group one that has constantly and proactively sought to attract FDI includes UK, 
Ireland, the Benelux countries and Spain. The second group that was traditionally   27
unwelcoming to FDI and has recently become “FDI friendly” includes France, 
Portugal, Greece, the Scandinavian countries and the new EU members from Eastern 
Europe.  The third group that is still rather “unfriendly” to attract FDI includes 
Germany and Italy (Oman 2000).  
The EU policies to control state subsidies, or “state-aid,” are spelled out in the 
original Treaty of Rome in two articles. These articles deal with a general ban on 
fiscal and financial subsidies to industry as a whole. There is no direct reference to 
subsidies to attract FDI. There are three basic types of EU rules on government 
subsidies: rules to limit “strategic” subsidies to a particular sector, “horizontal” 
subsidies to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and “assistance” to poorer 
regions. However, some exceptions have been allowed for “state aid” to SMEs and 
poorer regions. As a result, governments of EU member-states are not allowed to give 
any incentives to attract FDI except for projects in “least-favoured” regions. The 
status of “least-favoured” or “development” regions, however, is to be determined by 
the EU. To qualify for this, the per capita GDP has to be no more than 75 per cent of 
average EU per capita GDP (Santos 2000, Hendriks 2000, Oman 2000). 
For the “least-favoured” regions, governments can provide up to 50 per cent of 
the value of an investment project’s fixed assets; for the “development areas” the aid 
is limited to 20 per cent of the value of the project’s fixed assets. If governments want 
to give “aid,” they have to apply in advance, and it is up to the Commission to decide 
whether a particular project is eligible for this “aid” or not. This type of development 
assistance to less favoured regions has, thus, been the only financial incentive allowed 
by the EU to attract FDI. For example, 80 per cent of all “Greenfield” FDI in Ireland 
received such “aid” (Oman 2000, p. 58).    28
However, despite these regulations - and in addition to what has been 
previously noted - there are signs of increased competition for inward investment in 
the form of a considerable increase in the number and range of activities of national 
investment promotion agencies within the EU. A number of these agencies are now 
opening their offices abroad and are proactively seeking to recruit projects from their 
neighbouring countries. We have also mentioned in Table 2 a number of inward FDI 
projects in the EU where incentives have played a role. Examples are as Hyundai’s 
1996 semi-conductor investment in Scotland, where the British government 
reportedly paid about USD190,000 per job directly created by the project; Ford-VW’s 
investment in the automobile industry in Portugal in 1996 offering 5000 new jobs, 
which received an investment package of USD265,000 per job; and VW’s investment 
in Lower Saxony to save 2,300 jobs, that reportedly received about USD180,000 per 
job (Oman 2000, p. 59).  
While the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty do not distinguish between 
general and specific tax measures that have discriminating or restrictive effects, this 
distinction is paramount in the area of state aid law under Article 87 EC (Schön 
1999). Article 87(1) prohibits aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition ‘by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Most investment 
agencies in Europe thus claim that although the competition for FDI is fierce, it has 
not led to bidding wars (Oman 2000, p. 60). In some countries, for example the new 
EU members, tax concessions have been more important than financial incentives to 
attract FDI. The danger of tax incentives to attract FDI led the EU council to adopt a 
code of conduct in December 1997. The adoption of stiffer regulations may act in a 
perverse way and fuel the development and use of non-transparent incentives. 
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6.2 The Code of Conduct 
According to the code of conduct, member states agreed not to use ‘harmful’ tax 
measures and to roll back existing harmful measures (OECD 1998). The Commission 
also reduced ‘less favoured’ regional investment incentives (from 75 per cent to 50 
per cent) and ‘development areas’ incentives (from 30 per cent to 20 per cent). Efforts 
were also made to increase the coherence between individual governments’ aid 
programme with EU’s own regional assistance programme. The Code of Conduct 
attempts to deal with situations where ‘potentially harmful’ tax measures are 
‘unfairly’ competitive by virtue of ‘a significant effect on the location of business 
activity’. It follows that where potentially harmful tax measures amount to state aid, a 
Commission enforcement action against a member state in the European Court of 
Justice is possible. Despite the fact that the Code is not legally binding, it mentions 
the possibility of Commission enforcement (Bratton and McCahery 2001).  
Under the Code of Conduct, a member state can continue to assume a 
competitive posture with the introduction of an across-the-board tax reduction that 
benefits both existing businesses and potential investments. This stance aligns itself 
with the State aid rules, in that specific tax measures are subject to the rules, whereas 
general tax measures are not. The Code furthermore permits that member states 
should not be restrained from introducing a reduction in business taxes to stimulate 
the competitiveness of the domestic business environment.  
 
6.3 WTO Rules 
The GATT had no FDI issues on its agenda but exclusively trade issues. With the 
emergence of the WTO in 1995 the scenery changed somewhat. WTO requires that 
member states should make their regulations conform to WTO rules. The subsidies or   30
incentives have to follow the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement). All pre-operational investment incentives are 
considered subsidies and are prohibited according to SCM. Some subsidies, for 
example, “Production Subsidy,” are not prohibited but are “actionable” and are 
subject to challenge in case they cause adverse effects on the interests of another 
WTO member. However, the WTO only regulates subsidies in the goods sector and 
the SCM Agreement is not easily applicable to all kinds of investment incentives, in 
particular location incentives (UNCTAD 2002, p. 209).  
As the WTO only deals with “trade”, the granting of incentives in the pre-
production period - and not for trade of goods - creates problems in the measurement 
of adverse effects for other member states. By the time production and trade/exports 
have started, incentives given to attract investment have often ended. Moreover, even 
if contested, the WTO settlement is not likely to “undo” or change investment that has 
already been made. Although countervailing duties can be imposed, this can only be 
done if another member state can determine that there are subsidised imports coming 
into its market (from that particular investment), that this is harmful to its domestic 
industry and that there is an established link between the subsidised imports and the 
“harm.” However, although there is a provision in the SCM Agreement that a state 
may be asked to withdraw tax holidays given to attract FDI and perceived inconsistent 
with the provision of SCM Agreement, there is no mention of repayment of 
subsidies/incentives (WTO/DS126/RW, Article 21.5, 21 January 2002). 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
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In this paper, we have outlined the non-transparent race for inward FDI. We have 
emphasized that many forms of investment incentives exist today despite the efforts 
by the EU and the WTO to reduce their importance. We argue that governments will 
increasingly rely on the use of five categories of incentives to attract inward FDI in 
order to reduce unemployment, obtain access to important technology, and encourage 
management spill-over effects. We find that three of these categories are well-
designed for use in the non-transparent race. 
The incentives used in boom times will be predominantly soft, i.e. of a quality 
rather than a quantity character aimed at enhancing general productivity of a country 
by improving, for instance, the quality of its educational system and infrastructure 
without offending too many of the other member countries. However, one triggering 
mechanism for a stiffer race even in boom times is the appearance of China on the 
global map as an attractive production site, combined with the need for a restructuring 
of European industries following the introduction of the Euro. In times of recession 
and asymmetric shocks to particular EU-countries, fuelled by nationalism, the use of 
non-transparent incentives, such as cash-flow related activities, for example, the 
offering of grants and loans under favourable conditions, is likely to increase and 
stiffen the race.  The worst-case scenario is that the race becomes so strong that it 
threatens the cohesion of the entire EU. For China, there is a need to attract new 
investments implying new jobs to replace the jobs lost in the restructuring of the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in order to avoid social unrest. This insight may make the 
race between Chinese regions fierce. 
Here, there is a challenge to all policy-makers involved. In case of a non-
transparent race in its most extensive form, there is risk that nations with “losing” 
governments will try to protect themselves by re-imposing capital controls. Such an   32
action will at least temporarily hinder the outflow of capital to China. The re-
regulation may be contagious and trigger a general wave of re-regulation making the 
global welfare take a giant leap backwards. To prevent this scenario from coming 
true, the creation of a strong supranational institution with the task of supervising the 
race and equipped with enforcement power has to be given the highest priority among 
global policymakers. 
The challenge to researchers is to model the determinants of the FDI flows – 
be it in a New Economic Geography or an OLI context - while paying attention to the 
non-transparent incentives of the race as put forward in this paper. In the risk 
management context, the new kind of political risk emerging from the race calls for 
further analysis and theory development. The unwillingness of companies as well as 
of governments to reveal information about agreements and to provide data to the 
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Table 1 Contracted and Realised Investment from European Union into 
China 1990-2005 
Number of Projects  Contracted FDI Value  Realised FDI Value  Year 
EU  National 
Total 
EU  National Total  EU  National Total 
1990 82  7273  22422  659611  14735  348711 
1991 163  12978  75939  1197682  24562  436634 
1992 763  48764  96360  5812351  24297  1100751 
1993 1726  83437  318176  11143566  67124  2751495 
1994 1464  47549  562958  8267977  153769 3376650 
1995 1582  37011  741977  9128153  213131 3752053 
1996 1167  24556  675922  7327642  273706 4172552 
1997 1040  21001  422882  5100353  417115 4525704 
1998 1002  19799  593938  5210205  397869 4546275 
1999 894  16918  409566  4122302  447906 4031871 
2000 1130  22347  885516  6237952  447946 4071481 
2001 1214  26140  515284  6919455  418270 4687759 
2002 1486  34171  450693  8276833  370982 5274286 
2003 2074  41081  585432  11506969  393031 5350467 
2004 2423  43664  836189  15347895  423904 6062998 
2005 2846  44019  1153071  18906398  519378 7240569 
Source: MOFCOM FDI statistics 
   37
Table 2 Estimated incentives for automotive, electronics, chemicals and 
semiconductor FDI projects – Inward FDI (selective) in the US and the EU 
member states, 1980-2000. 
 
Date of package  Country of 
project 




Automotive – USA 
1980  United States  Honda      4,000   
1983  United States  Nissan    17,000  1,300 jobs 
1983  United States  Mazda-Ford    14,000  3,500 jobs 
1985  United States  GM Saturn    27,000  3,000 jobs 
1985  United States  Mitsubishi-Chrysler    35,000  2,900 jobs 
1985  United States  Toyota    50,000  3,000 jobs 
1986  United States  Fuji-Isuzu    51,000  1,700 jobs 
1993 United  States  Mercedes-Benz  170,000  1,500 
jobs/US$300m 
1994  United States  BMW    79,000  1,900 
jobs/US$800m 
1997 United  States  DaimlerChrysler  100,000  3,500 
jobs/US$750m 
1998  United States  Toyota    69,000  2,300 
jobs/US$1.2bn 
1999  United States  General Motors    60,000  3,800 
jobs/US$500m 
2000 United  States  Honda  105,000  1,500 
jobs/US$400m 
Automotive – Other 
1985  United Kingdom  Nissan    54,000  2,700 jobs 
1992 Portugal  Ford-Volkswagen  255,000  1,900 
jobs/US$484m 
1993  Hungary  GM  300,000   213 jobs/US$64m 
1997 Germany  Volkswagen  180,000  2,300  jobs 
1998  United Kingdom  Ford  138,000     500 jobs 
Electronics, chemicals and semiconductors 
1993  United States  Intel  120,000  2,400 jobs 
1994  United Kingdom  Samsung    30,000  3,000 jobs/US$89m 
1995  United Kingdom  Dupont  201,000  100 jobs, US$128m 
1995  United Kingdom  IMR    63,400   >0 jobs/US$3.17m 
1995 United  Kingdom  Siemens  51,000-190,000  1,500 
jobs/US$1.1bn 
1996 United  Kingdom  Hyundai  190,000   
1996  United Kingdom  LG    48,000  6,100 
jobs/US$320m 
1996 Germany  Dow  3,400.000  2,000  jobs/US$6.8m 
1997  United States  Shintech  500,000  250 jobs/US$125m 
 




























Austria   •  •    •      
Belgium  •    •  •  R        
Denmark   •  •    •     R 
Finland  •  •     R         
France  •    •    •  D R  R 
Germany  •  •  •  •  D        
Greece  •  •  •  •    •      
Ireland  •    •   D •   R   
Italy   •  •  •  D  •  D   R 
Luxembourg     •       R   
Netherlands     •    •      
Portugal  •  •  •  •     E  E  R 
Spain     •  •  R     R  R 
Sweden     •  •    •   R  R 
UK  •  •  •  •    •      
New 
Members 
              
Cyprus               R   
Czech 
Republic 
•  •  •    •   E   
Estonia                  
Hungary  •    •   R •   E   
Latvia               R   
Lithuania                  
Malta   •           E   
Poland                  
Slovak 
Republic 
           E   
Slovenia     •       R   
 
Source: Compiled from EUBIR (2001)   
 
Notes: D – Tax deductible; E- Exemption; R- Reduced rate.   39







































Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006 
 
 